Teoria dell'informazione e congiuntura italiana e internazionale - eng
Teoria dell'informazione e congiuntura italiana internazionale
Prof.ssa Anna Carabelli (II Parte)
Prof.ssa Daniela Sonedda (I Parte)
Code: E0277
SSD Insegnamento: SECS-P/01
12 ECTS – 96 hours
Sede: Novara
I parte Teoria dell'informazione
6 ECTS – 48 hours
Prof. Daniela Sonedda
- Language
Italian. Seminars could be held in english.
- Contents
The module of the Economics of Information aims at discussing the agents’ rational choice in presence of asymmetric information.
- References and textbooks.
Diamond (1984) “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring” Review of Economic Studies, 51, pp.393-414
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), “Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity” Journal of Political Economy, 91, pp. 401-419.
Diamond (2007) “Banks and Liquidity Creation: A Simple Exposition of the Diamond-Dybvig Model”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, 93, pp. 189–200
Diamond (1996), “Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring: A Simple Example”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, 82, pp 51-66.
A. Nicita e V. Scoppa (NS), Economia dei Contratti, Carocci, 2005
A. Baglioni (B), “Informazione e incertezza nella teoria finanziaria”, Hoepli
Frank, H. MICROECONOMIA – Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2014, ISBN: 9781308066325
- Objectives.
This course introduces students to basic tools widely used in modern microeconomics, examining a variety of models for the analysis of asymmetric information and contract theory.
- Prerequisites
Political economy/Macroeconomics, Economic policy.
- Teaching Method
Lectures.
- Further informations
Further informations can be found in the web page of the course at the URL https://eco.dir.unipmn.it/
- Examination
Two essays on the topics listed above
- Detailed Contents of the course
1. Introduction to the Economics of Information
2. Risk, uncertainty and asymmetric information: Chap. 13 (LC)
3. The 1984 Diamond’s model: Chap 7 Par 7.2 (B)
4. The Diamond and Dybvig’s model: Chap 7 Par 7.3 (B)
5. Contract theory and the principal-agent model: Chap. 2 (NS)
6. Empirical Evidence on Contract Theory: Chap. 2 (NS)
7. Main drawbacks of the agency model: Chap. 2 (NS)
8. Adverse Selection and signalling, the Spence’s Model: Chap. 5 (NS)
9. The relationship between quality and prices: Chap 5 Par. 5.2.2 (NS)
10. Credit rationing: Chap 5 Par 5.3.2 (NS) and Chap 7 (B)
11. A multi agent perspective: Chap 3 (NS)
12. The rationale for measuring performance: Chap 3 (NS)